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Copyright 1957, Chicago-Kent College of Law
VOLuMu 35 WINTE, 1956 NUMBE 1
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1955-56*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS
A LTHOUGH THE PAST JUDICIAL YEAR has seen no outstanding
developments in this field, the subject of corporations has
received more consideration during this period than has been true
of like periods in the recent past. In particular, attention has
been directed toward statutes relating to the subject. Section 38
of the Business Corporation Act' received its first judicial inter-
pretation in the case of Steigerwald v. A. M. Steigerwald Com-
pany,2 where it was held by the Appellate Court for the First
District that, under this provision, only directors of a corporation
might become members of the executive committee of the board
of directors, and that said members must be designated by the
board of directors. Thus, the appointment by the president of
the corporation of non-directors to the executive committee was
held invalid on both counts. In the case of Levin v. Hunter,3 the
same court determined that a "holdover" director under Section
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention to cases and
developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year. embracing from 6 Ill. (2d) 235 to 8 Ill. (2d) 630; from 6 Ill. App.
(2d) 326 to 10 Ill. App. (2d) 567.
1 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.38.
29 111. App. (2d) 31, 132 N. E. (2d) 373 (1955), noted in 34 CHI'AGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 339.
36 111. App. (2d) 461, 128 N. E. (2d) 630 (1955).
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34 of the Business Corporation Act 4 had no "term" of office which
could be filled for the "unexpired term" under the authority of
Section 36 of the same Act.5 The court, therefore, agreed with
the plaintiffs' contention that an election called for that purpose
was improper, but held that they had waived their right to object
by participating in said election.
In a suit against an Iowa corporation under the style Schaefer
v. H. B. Green Transportation Line, Inc.,6 a federal court was
asked to enforce the damage provisions of Section 45 of the
Business Corporation Act.7 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, while expressing doubt that Illinois law
was applicable at all, held that the provision was penal in nature
and could not be enforced in the federal courts. The right of a
corporation to grant stock options to its employees-or to a single
employees--was upheld in the case of Elward v. Peabody Coal
Company,9 wherein the Appellate Court for the First District
concluded that such power was conferred by Section 5(h) and
Section 24 of the Business Corporation Act. 10 But the corporation
in question was not permitted to grant an option to purchase the
stock at less than the par value thereof notwithstanding a possible
change in circumstances" which would make it lawful to issue
stock for the option price at the time that performance was due.
The so-called "blue-sky" laws 2 continued to be a prolific
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.34.
5 Ibid., § 157.36.
6232 F. (2d) 415 (1956).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.45. This section gives a shareholder a
right of action for damages in the amount of ten per cent of the value of the
shares held where he has been denied access to corporate records.
8 The court relied on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 131, § 1.03, which directs
that the plural shall be interpreted as including the singular.
99 Ill. App. (2d) 234, 132 N. E. (2d) 549 (1956).
10 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, §§ 157.5(h) and 157.24. The former gives
the corporation the power to make contracts and the latter permits the corporation
to issue shares to its employees without first offering them to shareholders.
11 For example, an amendment to the articles of incorporation reducing the par
value of the stock to less than the option price.
12 Presently Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 137.1 et seq. Although the
cases mentioned herein are governed by the Securities Act of 1919 as amended,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 1212, § 97 et seq., it is believed that they will
provide illumination in interpreting the current law.
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source of litigation. Perhaps the most significant decision in the
history of securities regulation on the state level is to be found
in the case of Foreman v. Holsman.13  Therein, the Appellate
Court for the First District held that a prior release from any
liability arising under the requirements of the Illinois Securities
Law '4 was not contrary to public policy and therefore reversed
a judgment for the plaintiffs. Inasmuch as leave to appeal has
been allowed, it is highly questionable whether this will long
remain the law, for if this decision is sustained, securities regu-
lation in Illinois, as a practical matter, will have come to an
inglorious end.
In the case of Hammer v. Sanders,15 an action for recission
brought under the prior Illinois Securities Act,"6 the Supreme
Court held that an agreement to share the cost of exploiting
property believed to contain oil was not a security interest
within the meaning of the aforementioned Act, even though the
assignment of a "working interest" was to follow successful
exploration. Similarly, the nature of a security, as defined by
the present Act,17 was involved in the case of Sire Plan Portfolios,
Inc. v. Carpentier.'8 The Appellate Court for the First District
there decided that a contract to purchase an interest in rental
real estate as a tenant in common with others, said property to
be managed and operated by others, was an "investment con-
tract" and, therefore, a security required to be registered.
Two other cases appear to be worthy of brief mention. The
Supreme Court, in the case of Janove v. Bacon,"9 held that where
a corporation had changed its name six years earlier, a summons
19 Ill. App. (2d) 317, 132 N. E. (2d) 688 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
allowed.
14 The reference is to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 1211/2, § 97 et seq., which
has since been repealed.
15 8 Ill. (2d) 414, 134 N. E. (2d) 509 (1956), affirming, on this point, 6 Il. App.
(2d) 346, 127 N. E. (2d) 492 (1955). Davis, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which
Schaefer and Klingbiel, JJ. concurred.
16 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121Y2, § 132.
17 Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 121/2, § 137.1 et seq.
188 Ill. App. (2d) 354, 132 N. E. (2d) 78 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
196 Ill. (2d) 245, 128 N. E. (2d) 706 (1955).
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issued in the old name was sufficient to confer jurisdiction if
served on the right corporation. Another interesting facet of
this case is the dicta contained therein to the effect that a
corporation might, more than two years after dissolution,20 have
de facto existence for purposes of a suit against it. And in the
case of People v. Hess,2 the Supreme Court concluded that the
sole owner of the stock of a dissolved corporation had a sufficient
interest22 in corporate real estate to redeem the same from a tax
foreclosure. The court was unimpressed by the fact that the stock
was held in the name of nominees.
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Within this area, the only cases of interest during the period
covered by the survey involved the law of partnerships. Perhaps
the most remarkable of these is the case of Jones v. Schellen-
berger,2 wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was concerned with the effect to be given a
partnership agreement which provided for rights of survivorship
in partnership property on the death of a partner. Despite the
contention that the agreement violated the Uniform Partnership
Act,24 the court concluded that the agreement was valid and was
determinative of the rights of the deceased partner's estate. It
appears that the only prior determination of the law of Illinois
on this point was made in an abstract opinion25 handed down
by the Appellate Court for the First District. Another case of
20 The two year period Is significant because the Business Corporation Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.94, expressly authorizes suits against a corpo-
ration if brought within two years after dissolution.
21 Sub. nom., Range v. Goldstein, 7 Ill. (2d) 192, 130 N. E. (2d) 280 (1955),
noted in 34 CeICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 265.
22 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 5 establishes a right of redemption from tax fore-
closures "in favor of owners and persons interested in such real estate." (Italics
supplied.)
23 225 F. (2d) 784 (1955). noted in 34 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REwVEw 239, and 44
Ill. B. J. 503.
24 Section 25(1) of said act provides that "a partner ... [holds] as a tenant in
partnership." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 106%, § 25(1). It Is then argued
that, since the right of survivorship is not Incident to a tenancy in partnership,
the agreement is invalid.
25 Lynch v. Ilg, 348 111. App. 545, 109 N. E. (2d) 362 (1952).
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some significance is that of Bonde v. Weber,21 in which the
contention was made that a change in the members of a partner-
ship violated a provision in a lease which prohibited assignments
without the consent of the lessor. The Supreme Court, however,
thought otherwise because of statutes providing that a partner's
right in specific partnership property is not assignable 1 and that
real estate acquired in the firm name can be conveyed only in
that name.28
An interesting factual situation was involved in the case of
Kurtz v. Kurtz,2 wherein a novel means for the creation of a
partnership has come to light. A decree of divorce granted the
plaintiff wife some twenty years earlier recited, pursuant to a
property settlement, that the wife was to receive an undivided
one-half interest in a business operated by the husband and he
was to give her a bill of sale for such one-half interest. The
Appellate Court for the First District held that a partnership
relation had been created by this decree and that the husband
must account to the wife for all profits earned since that time.
The ease of In re Sternberg's Estate"0 is noteworthy for the
reason that it portrays in bold relief the advantages of the
present Civil Practice Act.3' Since the case was governed by
prior practice, the Appellate Court for the Third District held
that it was improper to bring a suit against the estate of a
deceased partner on a joint obligation of all partners.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
Although the activities of real estate brokers provided the
courts with considerable work during the past year, only the
case of First National Bank of Millstadt v. Freant,32 decided by
266 Ill. (2d) 365, 128 N. E. (2d) 883 (1955).
27 111. Rev. Stat. 1965, Vol. 2, Ch. 1061/2, § 25 (2) (b).
28 Ibid., § 8(3).
29 10 Il. App. (2d) 310, 134 N. E. (2d) 609 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
30 Sub. nom., Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Estate of Sternberg, 10 Il. App. (2d)
258, 134 N. E. (2d) 663 (1956). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
81 IH. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 27 authorizes separate actions against
partners even though the obligation be joint.
327 Ill. App. (2d) 204, 129 N. E. (2d) 276 (1955).
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the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, is worthy of mention.
Therein, a broker engaged in business in another community,
successfully negotiated a deal concerning some property located
within a certain city. When suing for his commission, he was
met with the defense that his failure to have the license required
by the city in which the property was located invalidated the
contract between seller and broker. The reviewing court, how-
ever, was of the opinion that the broker was not affected by the
license requirement since, in general, ordinances for brokerage
licenses are not designed to tax real estate transfers but rather
have as their purpose the imposition of a fee upon the brokerage
occupation as such. Thus, a broker, though perhaps amenable to
a license fee imposed by the municipality where he carries on his
business, is not subject to a like requirement simply because of
the location of the property with which he deals.
Rather startling reasoning is contained in the case of Koehler
v. Ellison,3 3 in which liability was asserted against a principal for
misrepresentations made by his alleged agent. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took great pains in
pointing out that the person who made the averments was not
controlled in his physical movements by the principal and, there-
fore, was an independent contractor; since he was an independent
contractor-so the court reasoned-the principal was not liable
for his misrepresentations. It is, of course, hornbook law that
a principal may be liable in tort for the misrepresentations of
his agent whether the agent be servant or independent contrac-
tor.3 4 Thus, the finding by the court that the person who made
the misrepresentations was an independent contractor should not
have excluded the possibility that the principal might be liable
therefor.
The point decided in the case of Muenzer v. W. F. & John
Barnes Co.95 apparently is new in this state, though the result is
33226 F. (2d) 682 (1955).
34 See Tiffany, Handbook of the Law of Principal and Agent (West Publishing
Co., St. Paul, 1924), 2nd Ed., Ch. 6, § 41, p. 116 et seq.
359 Ill. App. (2d) 391. 133 N. E. (2d) 312 (1956). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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hardly surprising. Therein, the Appellate Court for the Second
District fell in line with other jurisdictions when it concluded
that if a person is employed for the purpose of using his creative
ability to develop a specific product or process, there is an implied
agreement that any such development belongs to the employer,
absent an express agreement to the contrary.
IABOR LAW
The frequently litigated question of whether employees who
become unemployed due to a work stoppage caused by a labor
dispute are eligible for unemployment compensation 6 appeared
in somewhat novel form in two decisions of the Supreme Court.
In the first of these, that of Buchholz v. Cummins,37 negotiations
between a union representing all restaurant employees in a cer-
tain town and an association representing the restaurant owners
for the renewal of a collective bargaining agreement became
deadlocked. A few days later the union employees, on some pre-
tense, went on strike against one association member. Pursuant
to a previous understanding between the association members, a
general shutdown of all member restaurants followed which con-
tinued until a new collective bargaining agreement was finally
reached. The union employees, who were locked out, claimed
compensation contending that their unemployment was not caused
by a labor dispute at the establishments at which they were
employed.8 The court, in denying compensation, declared that
a lockout was one form of a labor dispute and that there was
no difference in legal result as to whether a work stoppage was
caused by employer or employee as long as such stoppage was
due to a labor dispute.
A different result was reached in the case of Shell Oil Com-
36 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 434.
37 6 Ill. (2d) 382, 128 N. E. (2d) 900 (1955).
38 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 434 provides that "An individual shall be
ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it Is found that his total
or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a
labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or
was last employed ......
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pany v. Cummnins, 9 although a labor dispute was also the cause
of unemployment. In that case, separate unions represented the
various groups of employees working for the same employer.
A sizable group of these unions had formed a committee which
represented the employees of all the member unions in bargain-
ing negotiations, although no member union was bound by any
agreement so reached until it had accepted the terms thereof.
One of the member unions refused to accept an agreement nego-
tiated by the committee and ultimately went out on strike. The
non-striking employees refused to cross the picket lines set up
by the striking union because of a fear of violence. Inasmuch as
the non-striking employees belonged to a different class of
workers and they were not directly interested in the labor dispute,
the Supreme Court held that they fell within the exception to the
ineligibility provisions" and were entitled to compensation.
In the case of Ross v. Cummins,41 the contention was offered
that so-called estimators who worked for a firm which sold and
installed combination storm doors and windows within a certain
designated area were not employees within the meaning of the
Act.42 The Supreme Court, however, thought otherwise after it
had reviewed the amount of control exercised by the employer
over the claimants and noted that all work had been carried
on within the employer's franchise area, that is, his place of busi-
ness as that term has previously been construed.43  Though it
seems unnecessary, it may be well to remind the bar, as someone
was reminded in the case of United Mail Order, Warehouse &
Retail Employees Union, Local 20 v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
44
39 7 111. (2d) 329, 131 N. E. (2d) 64 (1956).
40 I1, Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 434 provides that the exclusion "shall not
apply if it is shown that (A) he is not participating in or financing or directly
interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work and (B) he does
not belong to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the com-
mencement of the stoppage there were members employed at the premises at which
the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly
interested in the dispute: . .. ."
417 Ii1. (2d) 595, 131 N. E. (2d) 521 (1956).
42 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 488, § 322.
43 Murphy v. Daumit. 387 Ill. 406, 56 N. E. (2d) 800 (1944).
44 6 Ill. App. (2d) 477. 128 N. E. (2d) 645 (1955). The decision was affirmed in
9 I1. (2d) 101, 137 N. E. (2d) 47 (1956), though this point apparently was not
raised. See also, Section II, Contracts, note 20.
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that a trade union is an unincorporated association and cannot
be sued in its own name. Therein, the Appellate Court for the
First District adhered to the position that a suit at law can be
maintained only in the names of all the members, however numer-
ous.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
One of the more significant developments 45 within the period
covered by this survey was the far-reaching extension of work-
men's compensation coverage as exemplified in the case of Jewel
Tea Company v. Industrial Commission.46 In that case, an em-
ployee, who had suffered injuries while playing baseball with a
team of fellow employees in an intra-company league, was held
to be entitled to workmen's compensation despite the fact that
the game took place after working hours in a public park and the
employee did not receive any monetary consideration for par-
ticipating in the game. In determining that the injury arose out
of and in the course of employment, stress was laid by the court
upon the active encouragement which the employer had given to
the intra-company league, and the subtle pressures for employee
participation exerted by the supervisory managers with the ap-
parent aim that good fellowship might be fostered among the
employees.
The Supreme Court took a reasonable view with respect to
demands to extend workmen's compensation coverage in Zelko-
vich v. Industrial Commission.7 It there held that a combination
restaurant, tavern and liquor store could not be considered an
extra-hazardous enterprise within the meaning of the Act,4
45 Although the cases of Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 6 Ill.
(2d) 278, 128 N. E. (2d) 714 (1955) and Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 6 II1. (2d) 296, 128 N. E. (2d) 718 (1955) are technically within this survey
period, they were discussed in the Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1954-55,
34 CmcAGo-KENT LAW Rzvrw 1 at 11.
466 Inl. (2d) 304, 128 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RKvIEw 172, 23 U. of Chicago L. R. 328, 5 DePaul L. R. 337, and 17 Miss. L. J. 158.
Maxwell, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
47 8 Ill. (2d) 146, 133 N. E. (2d) 300 (1956).
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.3 lists as extra hazardous, for this
purpose, enterprises in which sharp edged cutting tools are used.
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simply because some sharp edged cutting tools, such as butcher
knives, were used in the kitchen.
While the law is clear that an employer who has paid work-
men's compensation to his employee is entitled to a statutory
lien49 upon any judgment which the employee might recover on
account of the injury, the action which the employer may take
to protect his lien is not so clear. This uncertainty was alleviated
to some extent when the Appellate Court for the First District,
in the case of Sjoberg v. Ryerson & Son, Inc.,50 determined that
an employer had the right to intervene in a proceeding instituted
by his employee against a third party tortfeasor but that such
intervention did not include the right to participate in the conduct
or trial of the suit. Another interesting procedural question
was involved in the case of A. C. F. Industries, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission,51 where the first order of the commission had been
reversed by the Circuit Court of Cook County and the case sent
back to the commission. Review of the second order of the
commission was then sought in the Superior Court of Cook
County. The Supreme Court there concluded that orderly judicial
procedure demanded that a second review of the same proceeding
should be obtained in the same court in which the first review
was had.
II. CONTRACTS
Although no new precedents appear to have been established
in the field of contracts during the preceding year, the case of
Pure Milk Association v. Kraft Foods Company1 embodies an
unusual application of the law relating to assignments. The
plaintiff therein, a marketing association, had agreements with
various dairy farmers to market their milk through the associa-
tion which agreements provided that the association might author-
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5.
508 Ili. App. (2d) 414, 132 N. E. (2d) 56 (1956), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT L&w
REvTEw 269, and 56 Columbia L. R. 1241.
518 Ill. (2d) 552, 134 N. E. (2d) 764 (1956).
18 Il1. App. (2d) 102, 130 N. E. (2d) 765 (1955).
